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IN DEFENSE OF KEEPING BLACKMAIL A
CRIME: RESPONDING TO BLOCK
AND GORDON
James Lindgren*
In a recent issue of this journal, Walter Block and David Gordon
argued that some kinds of common blackmail or extortion threats should
no longer be criminal.1 They would legalize threats that could be legally
carried out. If you could do something, they say, you ought to be able to
threaten to do it. So, for example, they would allow me to make the
following threats: I will expose that you had an extramarital affair, beat
your spouse or had an abortion unless you pay me $1000 a month for the
rest of your life. If I could legally expose the damaging information (and
I could), they think I ought to be able to threaten to expose it unless paid
off. They would simply wipe out this large class of blackmail-threats to
take legal acts. Elsewhere in the literature, this problem is called the
paradox of blackmail.2
To reach their strange conclusion, Block and Gordon attack the
work of several scholars-Robert Nozick, Richard Posner, Richard Ep-
stein and myself. Of course, I am pleased when anyone takes my work
seriously enough to say it is wrong. And I am particularly pleased to be
in such illustrious company. I am writing here to advance two positions,
one in defense of all four of us,3 one in defense of myself alone.
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia, 1985-87; Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Connecticut. B.A. 1974, Yale University; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago. The
author wishes to dedicate this article to Randy Block.
1. Block & Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to Posner, Epstein,
Nozick and Lindgren, 19 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 37 (1985).
2. See generally Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670
(1984); Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIsT 156, 156-57 (1980); Williams,
Blackmail, 1954 CRIM. L. Rlv. 79, 163.
3. Although I am speaking here in defense of Nozick, Posner and Epstein, I am not
speaking on their behalf. The arguments are my own, and I suspect that Nozick and Posner,
in particular, think differently than I do about the role of morality in law. See infra notes 7-15
and accompanying text. My own critiques of their theories (as well as other theories of black-
mail) are set out in Lindgren, supra note 2.
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I. DEFENDING BLACKMAIL THEORISTS
A. The Empty Search for Violations of Rights
I think Block and Gordon reach different results from the rest of us
mostly because they take a different approach. Nozick, Posner, Epstein
and I looked at blackmail and tried to explain what is particularly im-
moral, inefficient or harmful about the behavior. Block and Gordon, on
the other hand, admit its immorality but point out that it is consensual
and ask instead: What rights does blackmail violate? They conclude
that informational blackmail violates no right of the victim and thus
should be legal.
At the most basic (and trivial) level, every crime involves a violation
of rights-if only a citizen's right to be free of the behavior prohibited by
the crime. A homicide is criminal since it violates the right not to be
killed. Robbery is criminal since it violates the right not to be robbed.
And blackmail is criminal since it violates the right not to be
blackmailed. Obviously, Block and Gordon mean something more than
this. They assume that something can be made criminal only if it violates
some other law, only if there is a source of illegality independent of the
law against the particular behavior. This is a misguided search.
Using Block and Gordon's standards for criminality, it would be
difficult to justify making almost any behavior criminal-even murder.
For except for killing, what is wrong with murder? To justify making
murder criminal under Block and Gordon's standard, we would have to
discover some violated right other than the right not to be killed. The
core wrongdoing of murder is killing, just as the core wrongdoing of
blackmail is immoral coercion. Of course, murder causes harms other
than death, but so does blackmail cause harms other than immoral coer-
cion. Both the academic literature and the press have described lives
ruined by persistent blackmailers.4 You cannot require that every crime
be based, not on the harmful behavior that the crime prohibits, but on
some other law that the behavior might violate. How then would you
support that other law-by looking at yet a third. At some point you
would run out of prior laws. When we put behavior in a conceptual box
and call it criminal, it is not because it could just as easily fit in another
conceptual box. There must be something intrinsic in the behavior that
merits punishment.
Returning to murder, is murder criminal because it involves the
lesser crime of battery, which is an offensive touching? Then battery
4. See generally M. HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL (1975).
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would be criminal because it involves an assault, which is putting the
victim in fear of a battery. Collapsing the analysis, murder would be
criminal because it usually puts someone in fear of an offensive touching.
For such trivial behavior, the death penalty seems a bit severe. And even
if you were willing to accept this, it would not be enough to justify the
criminality of murder because we have not identified the crime that can
justify assault.
A slightly different version of this quest for violated rights would
look not to other crimes as justifications but instead to the civil law.
Thus, for instance, our civil law system recognizes the right of private
property, so that when someone steals from an owner, they violate the
owner's property rights. The owner has a civil remedy against the thief,
such as an action for conversion. In other words, the crime of theft can
be justified because it fits into the structure of the civil law system of
private property.
Yet if this is the approach Block and Gordon meant to take, the
criminality of blackmail would be justified. Our civil law usually counts
a blackmail threat as civil duress, 5 so that a contract signed under a
blackmail threat is unenforceable. 6 Moreover, most states treat black-
mail as a species of theft, so that all of the civil remedies available to
victims of theft should be available to victims of blackmail. Thus a
blackmail threat typically violates the victim's civil right to keep his
property and be free of duress. If the victim can show a resulting loss, he
can pursue his civil remedies.
Ultimately, the search for violated rights leads nowhere. To justify
every crime by showing that it is subsumed in another crime is fallacious,
since not every crime can be based on a logically prior crime. And if
Block and Gordon meant that behavior can be made criminal only if it
violates some corresponding civil right, blackmail would be adequately
justified, since the civil law provides its own remedies for blackmail
threats. To me, the question of rights is better understood as the goal
rather than the means to reach it. If we can figure out what is particu-
larly immoral or harmful about the behavior, then we have justified the
law's decision to give citizens a right to be free of blackmail.
5. See generally Gallon v. Lloyd-Thomas Co., 264 F.2d 821 (8th Cir. 1959); Hornstein v.
Paramount Pictures, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740 (1944).
6. A blackmail threat that seeks to compel action rather than obtain property could pre-
sumably be the subject of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, though
offhand I do not recall one.
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B. The Insufficiency of Consent to Negate Criminality
Block and Gordon make another point-that blackmail is consen-
sual. It is not clear whether they intend this as support for the notion
that blackmail violates no rights or as an independent ground negating
criminality. Yet whichever they intend, it is fairly easily dispensed with.
Consent is not a universal bar to criminality. If I buy a product
from a price-fixer, the contract is consensual. Yet I may have been the
victim of a criminal violation of the antitrust laws. This is true even if I
know that the price is higher than it would be in a fully competitive
market. Although I would prefer to pay the lower price, I am willing to
pay the higher price because I can still benefit from the contract at that
higher price. That the contract may be consensual is no bar to the anti-
trust laws prohibiting price-fixing.
Blackmail is similar. Although the victim may agree with the black-
mailer, that does not undercut society's consensus that the blackmailer is
taking unfair advantage of the victim. Block and Gordon admit as much
by granting the immorality of blackmail. The victim may prefer the
blackmail agreement to exposure, but what he really prefers is for the
blackmailer to go away empty-handed, keeping the secret.
Even Block and Gordon implicitly recognize that consent is not in
itself enough to negate criminality. They would, for example, make
criminal a professor's threat to flunk a student unless the student (who
deserves to pass) pays $50-since this breaches the professor's duty to
his school. Yet a student who gives in to such a threat is consenting to
the contract. The student must think that he can benefit from the con-
tract or he would not go along. Unlike Block and Gordon, I would put
this case on much the same ground as the earlier examples. Despite con-
sent, an agreement negotiated under certain kinds of immoral threats
may be punished as blackmail, just as other agreements negotiated im-
morally can be punished as price-fixing or fraud. After all, even a rob-
ber's threat, "Your money or your life" proposes a bargain where a
victim usually stands to gain by consenting. The crucial point in all these
cases is not consent, but the immorality of the leverage used to induce
"consent."
C. The Significance of Immorality
Block and Gordon are willing to admit the immorality of blackmail,
but reject the relevance of immorality to the criminal law. In attacking
Epstein, they say:
Perhaps [Epstein's argument] arises out of a confusion between
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morality (the study of what is or is not immoral) and legal phi-
losophy (the study of what should or should not be prohibited
by force of law).... Blackmail may well be underhanded, evil,
vicious, reprehensible and immoral. But that is entirely beside
the point. Our concern here is solely with the question of the
criminal, not moral, status of blackmail.7
Instead of immorality, they focus unhelpfully on violations of rights. It
is almost as if as nonlawyers they have heard the shibboleth "You can't
legislate morality" and assumed that immorality has little to do with the
criminal law. Although the precise relation of morality to criminal law is
open to wide debate, most theories of the criminal law emphasize moral-
ity very heavily. Henry Hart went perhaps a bit further than most when
he wrote, "What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all
that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community con-
demnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition."8 A current
textbook written by official commentators to the Model Penal Code ex-
plains: "That the criminal law derives from moral values cannot be
doubted; some notion of right and wrong necessarily underlies the deci-
sion of what to punish."9 Most theories combine some notion of immo-
rality with some notion of harm, disutility or inefficiency. A few center
only on the latter concerns. None to my knowledge adopt Block and
Gordon's novel approach of requiring violations of independent rights.
Immorality matters. As a society, we have rejected Lady Wootton's
proposal that we make bad results criminal and worry about intent only
in sentencing.10 In defining almost every serious crime, we require mens
rea----or in the terminology of the Model Penal Code, "culpability."'I In
drawing the line between homicide and legitimate self-defense, most of
the law is based on whether the threatened person was acting unreasona-
bly. The modern trend is to treat attempts for most crimes as seriously
as completed crimes, in part because although the results differ, the mo-
rality of the behavior is similar. Again and again, morality comes up in
setting the boundaries of the criminal law. The few crimes that do move
7. Block & Gordon, supra note 1, at 47.
8. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958).
9. P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW 34 (2d ed. 1986). Low and Jef-
fries are reporters for the Model Penal Code.
10. B. WoorTON, CRIME AND CRIMINAL LAW (1963). See also Leivitt, Extent and Func-
tion of the Doctrine ofMens Rea, 17 ILL. L. REv. 578 (1923). But see H.L.A. HART, PUNISH-
MENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
(1968).
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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away from morality by not requiring mens rea are often vigorously at-
tacked by criminal law theorists.
But not all immoral behavior is criminal. This may be because
either the behavior is not sufficiently immoral, it does not cause serious
enough harm or it is not a traditional concern of the criminal law.IZ For
example, usually lying is seriously immoral but not illegal. But if lying is
used to gain property or advantages from other people, it may be pun-
ished as civil and criminal fraud. Blackmail is similar. As Block and
Gordon admit, it is a seriously immoral way of obtaining property or
advantages. Like other seriously immoral ways of obtaining property, it
is made criminal. At common law, one type of blackmail, a threat to
accuse of sodomy, was punished under the crime of robbery.'3 Today
many states consolidate blackmail with other immoral ways of gaining
property under their theft statutes. 14
The importance of morality to crime definition cuts across all ways
of gaining property or compelling action. For example, a threat or use of
force is usually criminal. But sometimes the police or private citizens
may threaten or use force to make an arrest or stop a crime. 5 The un-
reasonable or immoral use of force is made criminal; the reasonable or
moral use of force is justified. Much the same is true of blackmail.
Threats are made criminal depending on their immorality.
II. DEFENDING THE CRIMINALITY OF BLACKMAIL
The next step is to determine what separates fair from unfair threats
seeking property or compelling action. This is not an easy task, and un-
like Block and Gordon, I am not willing to grant the immorality of
blackmail without some explanation. Here Posner, Epstein, Nozick and
I all take different approaches. Thus I must stop defending the four of us
and move to my own defense. To respond to Block and Gordon's partic-
ular criticisms of my explanation for blackmail, I must repeat a summary
of my views:
12. Block and Gordon seem to think that blackmail is not a traditional concern of the
Anglo-American criminal law, but it has been a crime for more than two centuries. Threats of
harm (whether deserved or not) have been a concern even longer, as have immoral ways of
acquiring other people's property.
Richard Posner has argued that the central purpose of the criminal law is to discourage
coercive transfers. See Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193 (1985).
13. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 372 (2d ed. 1969). Also, the commentary to
the influential Field Code states that "extortion partakes in an inferior degree of the nature of
robbery." N.Y. PENAL CODE § 584 (Proposed Code 1865).
14. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.0-223.9 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
15. See, e.g., id. §§ 3.04-3.09.
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[T]he key to the wrongfulness of the blackmail transaction is its
triangular structure. The transaction implicitly involves not
only the blackmailer and his victim but always a third party as
well. This third party may be, for example, the victim's spouse
or employer, the authorities or even the public at large. When
a blackmailer tries to use his right to release damaging informa-
tion, he is threatening to tell others. If the blackmail victim
pays the blackmailer, it is to avoid the harm that those others
would inflict. Thus blackmail is a way that one person requests
something in return for suppressing the actual or potential in-
terests of others. To get what he wants, the blackmailer uses
leverage that is less his than someone else's. Selling the right to
go to the police involves suppressing the state's interests. Sell-
ing the right to tell a tort victim who committed the tort in-
volves suppressing the tort victim's interests. And selling the
right to inform others of embarrassing (but legal) behavior in-
volves suppressing the interests of those other people.
Noninformational blackmail involves the same misuse of a
third party's leverage for the blackmailer's own benefit. For
example, when a labor leader threatens to call a strike unless he
is given a personal payoff, he is using the leverage of third par-
ties to bargain for his own benefit. Thus the criminalization of
informational and noninformational blackmail represents a
principled decision that advantages may not be gained by extra
leverage belonging more to a third party than to the
threatener. 16
Block and Gordon make essentially three criticisms. First, they ar-
gue that there is no relevant difference between suppressing information
and releasing it. This is an odd argument for the authors to make in an
article entitled "Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech."17 After all, the
framers of the Constitution thought that releasing information was so
important that they wrote the first amendment to protect that behavior.
Any effort to understand something as elusive as blackmail must be will-
ing to recognize distinctions more subtle than the one between the release
and the suppression of information. In my view, someone who takes
money for suppressing a crime effectively settles the government's claim,
and for that reason may be punished as a blackmailer.
Second, Block and Gordon contend that there is no suppression of
16. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 672.
17. The full title is Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to Posner, Epstein,
Nozick and Lindgren. See Block & Gordon, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis added).
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claims in blackmail since a third party "is as free as before to pursue all
his legal remedies."' 8 In the example I just gave, the government can
still prosecute the criminal if they can discover the crime by other meth-
ods. In my article, I discussed this argument:
Thus when a blackmailer threatens to turn in a criminal unless
paid money, the blackmailer is bargaining with the state's chip.
The blackmail victim pays to avoid the harm that the state
would inflict; he pays because he believes that he can thereby
suppress the state's potential criminal claim. Of course, this
does not effect a legally binding settlement, but the leverage is
effective precisely to the extent that a victim believes that he
has reached an effective settlement.19
Without some hint from Block and Gordon about what is wrong with
my argument here, I do not know how to improve it. The blackmail
victim would not pay unless he thought that he had a good chance of
effectively settling the matter. And, undoubtedly, the amount the victim
is willing to pay depends in part on how likely it is that the settlement is
final. Once again, Block and Gordon ignore the de facto settlement of
claims, just because it is not a de jure settlement. This is a little like
ignoring defacto discrimination because it is not dejure discrimination.
Block and Gordon's last accusation is that my use of metaphors ob-
scured the true nature of things. At least as to using metaphors, I must
plead guilty. I speak about bargaining with someone else's chips and
settling other people's claims with a fully disclosed recognition that some
of the claims they are settling are legally enforceable and some are not.
Analogy and metaphor seemed the best way to express that blackmail
law treats the enforceable and unenforceable interests of third parties in
roughly equivalent ways. Thus if you threaten to expose a tortfeasor un-
less the tortfeasor pays you off instead of the victim of the tort, you are
bargaining with the tort victim's claim. Now it may be invoking a meta-
phor to say that you are "settling" that tort victim's claim. The
tortfeasor is paying in the hope that he has made an effective settlement,
which in this case is analogous to a legal settlement. To me, the law of
blackmail expresses the consensus that a threatener does not have a suffi-
cient personal stake in the potential dispute between the tortfeasor and
the tort victim so that he may effectively settle that dispute through
blackmail.
Looking at analogous cases was not an act of desperation; it was
18. Id. at 53.
19. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 702.
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quite consciously part of my method. To illuminate the subtleties of the
problem and my attempted explanation, I discussed or mentioned scores
of examples (in fact many more than any other blackmail theorist). And
I followed a method commonly used for examining philosophical ideas.
For instance, in his little classic, Thinking With Concepts,2" Cambridge
philosopher John Wilson lays out a method for analyzing difficult con-
cepts-like truth, equality or blackmail. Although I do not pretend that
I slavishly followed Wilson's method, I did take his main suggestions. I
looked at model cases to find the core of the concept.21 I looked at
counter-examples to explain why they were not part of the concept.22 I
looked at borderline cases to explain what made them odd or difficult.23
And I looked at analogous cases to search for similar principles and to fit
my theory into a broader context.24 I may not have succeeded, but I
doubt that speaking metaphorically hindered anyone's understanding of
my ideas. I suspect that the analogies had the opposite effect. And, in-
deed, Block and Gordon seem to understand the similarities I point to;
they simply reject their relevance.
At first glance, all three of Block and Gordon's criticisms of my
theory seem shockingly literal. They fail to see the difference between
suppressing and releasing information, fail to recognize the similarity be-
tween blackmail and settling or suppressing other people's interests, and
seem to reject the very idea of using analogies.
But I think that all these particular criticisms are explainable if you
remember their general approach-the misguided search for rights viola-
tions. A theorist looking for violations of rights might say: It doesn't
matter whether you suppress or release information if you don't violate
anyone's rights by doing so. Moreover, you don't violate anyone's rights
by effectively (though not legally) settling someone else's claim. And
last, don't analogize similar types of immoral leverage since they are not
sufficiently similar if some leverage involves abridging rights and some
doesn't.
Thus all Block and Gordon's criticisms of my theory are not really
as specific as they seem. Nor do they stem from literal-mindedness.
Rather they arise from applying different standards for criminality, in-
sisting on violations of rights independent of the right to be free of black-
mail threats. Posner, Epstein, Nozick and I all use lower standards for
20. J. WILSON, THINKING WITH CONCEPTS (1963).
21. See id. at 28-29.
22. See id. at 29-30.
23. See id. at 31.
24. See id. at 30-31.
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criminality, which may explain why we (for different reasons) argue that
blackmail ought to be illegal. Block and Gordon's standard for criminal-
ity is unrealistically high-too high to explain the illegality of almost any
crime, let alone one as difficult and paradoxical as blackmail.
